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Abstract
We present arguments for treating health insurance and disability insurance
in an integrated manner in economic analysis, based on a model where each
individuals utility depends on both consumption and health and her income
depends on her earnings ability. When purchasing insurance, she may choose a
contract that o¤er less than full medical treatment. We nd that high-ability
individuals demand full recovery and equalize utility across states, while low-
ability individuals demand partial treatment and cash compensation and su¤er
a loss in utility if ill. Our results carry over to the case where health states are
not observable.
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1 Introduction
Random changes in health, e.g. due to illness, a¤ect a persons well-being in several
ways. One way is the direct e¤ect of health on well-being. But there are also
some indirect e¤ects. First, reduced health may a¤ect the persons utility from
consumption. Secondly, medical expenses necessary to recover from illness reduce
a¤ordable consumption. Finally, illness may a¤ect the ability to generate income
in the rst place. In this paper, we argue that a proper treatment of health risk
and health insurance should take all these e¤ects of an illness into account, and we
o¤er a theoretical model in which to do it. In this model, an individuals utility
depends on both consumption and health and her income depends on her earnings
ability. When purchasing health insurance, she may choose to receive less than full
medical treatment when ill, and support consumption from a combination of cash
compensation and her remaining earnings ability.
While health insurance and disability insurance are in fact integrated in a num-
ber of European countries with public tax-nanced (social) insurance systems, the
economics literature has treated the two risks as separate problems, with the risk
of medical expenditures to be covered by health insurance and the risk of losses in
labour market productivity to be covered by disability insurance. The present work
is an attempt at correcting this, putting a coordinating perspective on health and
disability insurance. In particular, we expand the concept of health insurance to
include not only coverage against medical costs but also against permanent loss in
earning ability, arguing that these are two types of consequences of the same risk,
i.e. the risk of su¤ering a loss in health.
Whereas health and disability insurance in most European countries is heavily
subsidized  in e¤ect, a cross-subsidization takes place from individuals with high
earnings abilities to those with low abilities  our analysis addresses the question of
what the outcome would be without any transfers. We nd that individuals with low
earnings abilities indeed trade o¤ health for consumption. Letting insurance con-
tracts o¤er individuals various combinations of medical treatment and cash compen-
sation of income loss if they become ill, we nd, in particular, that high-productivity
individuals choose contracts providing full medical treatment while low-productivity
individuals choose contracts o¤ering partial medical treatment and partial compen-
sation for loss in earnings. Low-productivity individuals consequently choose not
to fully recuperate from an illness but rather receive cash payment that partly o¤-
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sets the income loss due to partial impairment.1 Moreover, even in this setting
where there is symmetric information about health risks and health states, such
low-productivity individuals end up being less than fully insured, in the sense that
they have lower utility when ill than when healthy.
These results have interesting policy implications. Whereas there is much focus
among many policy makers on the issue of providing health insurance that covers all
individuals in a fair and uniform manner, our analysis points to reasons for o¤ering
a menu of health insurance contracts, where cash compensation may substitute for
the right to full recovery.2 In the case where health insurance schemes are also used
as a means of redistributing income, our analysis indicates that this issue is related
to redistribution in cash, i.e., through the tax system: a low-productivity individual
may actually prefer to receive support from government in the form of cash rather
than in the form of improved health, since better health has a smaller e¤ect on
consumption for low-skilled people than for high-skilled ones.3
Like the traditional literature on health insurance, we focus on illnesses for which
a treatment is available that fully restores pre-illness health and ability. However, in
other work, individualsdesire to restore health is taken for granted.4 In Marchand
and Schroyen (2005), for example, there is no loss of health for an individual who falls
ill, only a loss of time caused by illness. In their model, high-productivity individuals
get well immediately at a private practice, while low-productivity ones su¤er a time
loss while waiting in the public health-care system. This time loss constitutes an
ine¢ ciency, whereas the outcome in our model is e¢ cient, with low-productivity
individuals getting compensation in cash instead of full treatment.
In other work where non-monetary consequences of illness are taken into account,
1Our ndings are in accordance with the empirical observation that individuals with less school-
ing are more likely to be disabled than those with more schooling [e.g., Haveman and Wolfe (2000)]
and may provide an explanation for this correlation in addition to those traditionally put forward.
2Of course, there are normative arguments for giving all individuals the right to full recovery
whenever feasible; such issues are not discussed here.
3This theme has been picked up by Fleurbaey (2006), who notes its consequences for discussions
of health and equity: the poor being less healthy than the rich may in part be a result of individual
preferences.
4One exception is Byrne and Thompson (2000), who argue that, when the probability of success-
ful treatment is small, the insured may be better o¤ with cash compensation if ill, rather than going
through the treatment. We shall assume that full treatment, if chosen, provides full restoration of
health with certainty.
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it is assumed that utility is state dependent and that health is either irreplaceable
or not restorable.5 In this paper, we allow for both monetary and non-monetary
consequences of illness without imposing assumptions either that health will always
be fully restored or that it is irreplaceable. Thus, we provide a bridge between
the health-insurance literature, which typically takes only monetary consequences
of illness into account, and the disability-insurance literature postulating that health
is irreplaceable or non-restorable.
Our model has the following crucial features. First, we make the reasonable
assumption that an individuals productivity is a¤ected by her health: If she su¤ers
an illness and health is not fully restored, then her productivity will be negatively
a¤ected by the illness. The e¤ect is that individuals with low full productivity have
lower incentives for restoring health and therefore will tend to prefer contracts with
cash compensation for illness.6 Second, we use a bivariate formulation of utility that
allows for interactions between consumption and health. In particular, we make the
assumption that the two are complements, i.e., that an individuals marginal utility
of consumption is increasing in health.7
Our main analysis takes place in a world of symmetric information about health
risks and health states, while the individualsability may be private information.
However, we show that our ndings hold also in a situation where an individuals
health is non-veriable, i.e., when insurers face problems of ex-post moral hazard.
In fact, if ex-post moral hazard is a problem, then integrating medical insurance
(with in-kind provision of medical treatment) and disability insurance (with cash
compensation) reduces the insured individuals incentive to falsely claim to be ill
when in good health; in other words, integration induces self-selection.8
5Analyses based on health being non-restorable include Zeckhauser (1970), Arrow (1974), Viscusi
and Evans (1990), Evans and Viscusi (1991), and Frech (1994). Health is irreplaceable if individuals
value restored health lower than pre-illness health; see Cook and Graham (1977) and Schlesinger
(1984).
6 In related work by Jack and Sheiner (1997) and Koç (2004), the demand for health insurance is
discussed in a situation where, like in our model, the consumption of health care is endogenous. An
important di¤erence, however, is that these authors disregard the e¤ect of illness on an individuals
earnings ability.
7Such interaction is standard in analyses of disability insurance where it is called state-dependent
utility; see references in footnote 5. Our assumption of complementarity between consumption and
health is in line with the results from the empirical study by Finkelstein, et al. (2008).
8Asheim et al. (2003) analyse a version of our model with asymmetric information about an
individuals probability of illness, i.e., a situation where insurers face problems of adverse selection.
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The outline of this paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section 2 while
our main ndings are derived in Section 3. We discuss the case of ex-post moral
hazard in Section 4. Our results are discussed in a concluding Section 5. Proofs are
relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
Consider an individual who has preferences over consumption, c, and health, h. The
individual faces exogenous uncertainty with respect to her state of health. She may
either be healthy, which corresponds to state 1, or she may fall ill, which corresponds
to state 2. The two states are mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, and veriable.
In state 1, the level of health is normalized to 1: h1 = 1. In state 2, the individual
is ill and, without any medical treatment, su¤ers a complete loss in health: h2 = 0.
Health if ill may, however, be partially or fully restored (instantly and with certainty)
if the individual receives medical treatment: t 2 [0; 1], i.e., treatment is assumed
to be a continuous variable. Medical treatment leading to full recovery is available
at cost C, while treatment at cost tC leads to partial recovery. Health in state 2
is henceforth measured by the fraction of C spent on treatment, that is, h2 = t.
Consumption in the two states is denoted c1 and c2, respectively.
The probability of falling ill is known to the individual and given by  2 (0; 1).
The individual seeks to maximize the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
(1  )u(c1; 1) + u(c2; t);
where u(c; h) is a Bernoulli utility function. We assume that u : R2+ ! R is twice
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly concave, and satises: 8(c; h) 2 R2++, uc > 0
and uh > 0, where partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts. In particular, a
strictly concave u implies that the individual is risk averse. Moreover, health and
consumption are assumed to be complements in utility: uch > 0. This assumption is
in accordance with the empirical results of Finkelstein, et al. (2008) and implies that
individuals take more pleasure in consumption when health is good than when health
is poor. We also assume that uc(c; h) ! 1 as c # 0 whenever h > 0, uh(c; h) ! 1
as h # 0 whenever c > 0, and uc(c; h)!1 or uh(c; h)!1 as c # 0 and h # 0. Note
that our assumptions on u imply normality.
Strict concavity implies that marginal utility from treatment is higher at a low
treatment ratio than at a high one, and that an intermediate level of treatment
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is preferred to an uncertain prospect of either complete or zero treatment with the
same expected cost. Since leisure is not included in the utility function, we implicitly
assume that leisure is constant (and thus, labour supply is xed) across states.
There exists a competitive insurance market in which prot maximizing insurers
o¤er insurance at an actuarially fair premium. Information about the individuals
probability  of falling ill, which disease she is su¤ering from and, consequently,
the associated costs of treatment, is symmetrically distributed among the market
participants. Moreover, health state is veriable, so that insurance can be o¤ered
contingent on it. (A situation where health state is non-veriable is discussed in
Section 4.)
The individuals ability, i.e., her inherent capacity to generate earnings, is de-
noted A (> 0). By normalization, A also denotes the individuals labour earnings
when well, i.e., in state 1. Labour earnings in state 2 are proportional to the amount
spent on medical treatment: By spending tC, the individual obtains an ability equal
to tA in state 2. The analysis does not require insurance companies to know the
individuals ability; hence A may be private information.
Illness entails two types of loss: nancial and non-nancial. The nancial loss
includes reduced earnings due to lower ability (productivity) and medical expendi-
tures. The non-nancial loss is in the form of reduced utility due to poorer health.
Health if ill is however endogenous, and so the size of the non-nancial loss is also
endogenous. Indeed, if the individual chooses treatment leading to full recovery
(t = 1), then she su¤ers a nancial loss only, viz., the costs of treatment, while if
she chooses partial treatment (0 < t < 1), then she su¤ers both a nancial and a
non-nancial loss.
The individuals insurance decision takes place prior to her knowing which state
has occurred. Her budget constraints in states 1 and 2 are respectively given by:
c1 + I = A;
and
c2 + I + tC = tA+ I;
where I is the insurance premium to be paid in both states of the world in order
to receive compensation equal to I if ill. It follows that
I = tC + c2   tA+A  c1;
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that is, the insurance provides for both medical expenditures, tC, and a cash com-
pensation, c2   tA+ A  c1.9 By eliminating I from the two budget constraints, it
follows that the individual is constrained by:
A  c1 = [tC + (c2   tA+A  c1)] (1)
when ex ante making her choice of c1, c2, and t.
In the following, we characterize the individuals demand for insurance with
respect to both level and type of coverage. In particular, we analyze how the indi-
viduals ability A inuences her choice of compensation: whether to be compensated
in the form of health restoration, i.e., medical treatment, and/or in the form of cash,
i.e., compensation for loss in income due to incomplete recovery.
3 Analysis
Treatment leading to a health level t is available at a cost tC when ill. For the
purpose of our analysis, however, we ask more generally what is the maximum
utility achievable if the individual has to pay P ( 0) for treatment t:
U(t; P ;A) := max
(c1;c2)
f(1  )u(c1; 1) + u(c2; t)g
s:t: (1  )c1 + (c2 + P ) = (1  )A+ tA;
where, for the purpose of dening and analyzing the U function, we allow t > 1, so
that U : R++  [0; (1=   (1  t))A)R++ ! R. Solving this problem, we nd the
consumption function in each state:
(c1(t; P ;A); c2(t; P ;A)) 2 R2++,
satisfying
uc(c1(t; P ;A); 1) = uc(c2(t; P ;A); t) (2)
and the budget constraint in (1). Consumption in each state is a function of treat-
ment t (i.e., the degree of recovery in state 2), the price of treatment P , and ability
A. In optimum, the individuals marginal utility of consumption is equal across
states.
9Since the premium I = A   c1 must be paid in both states, disposable income net of the
premium equals tA  (A  c1) if no cash compensation is received. Hence, the cash compensation
is c2   [tA  (A  c1)] :
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We write the utility function U as:
U(t; P ;A) = (1  )u(c1(t; P ;A); 1) + u(c2(t; P ;A); t) ;
and have that U is strictly increasing in t, strictly decreasing in P , and strictly
increasing in A.
The marginal rate of substitution between t and P , given A, is:
MRS (t; P ;A) =  
@U
@t
@U
@P
=
uh(c2; t)
uc(c2; t)
+A; (3)
where the second equality follows from the envelope theorem and equation (2). As
shown in the Appendix, the utility function U has the single-crossing property,
i.e., MRS is increasing in A, and features diminishing willingness to pay for treat-
ment, i.e., it is quasi-concave. These two properties of U are illustrated in Figure
1: diminishing willingness to pay for treatment implies that indi¤erence curves are
strictly concave, and the single-crossing property implies that the slopes of indi¤er-
ence curves are steeper, the higher is A.
< FIGURE 1 about here >
Due to the diminishing willingness to pay for treatment, an individual being faced
with the possibility of purchasing treatment t at cost P = tC, constrained by t  1,
will have a unique level of treatment t(A) maximizing U(t; tC;A). Furthermore, due
to the single-crossing property, t(A) is (weakly) increasing in A. In fact, whenever
0 < t(A) < 1, t(A) is determined by
MRS (t; P ;A) = C; (4)
i.e., marginal willingness to pay for treatment equals marginal cost of treatment. It
follows that t(A) is strictly increasing in A when 0 < t(A) < 1.
We have that t(A) = 1 for all A  A, where A is that level of ability, unique
by the single-crossing property, for which the indi¤erence curve through (1; C) has
slope C, so that unconstrained maximization of U(t; tC;A) leads to t = 1. We
dene A by
MRS (1; C;A) = C : (5)
We have that A < C, since MRS (1; C;A) > A. Moreover, it follows from (1) and
(2) that c1 = c2 = A C when t = 1 and P = C, implying that t = 1 is not feasible
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when A < C. Finally, since uc(c; h) ! 1 as c # 0 whenever h > 0, it follows that
@MRS (1; C;A)=@t ! 0 as A # C. Now, at A = C, full treatment will not be
chosen. It follows that A > C.
The optimum level of treatment is illustrated in Figure 2 for two di¤erent values
of ability: Al < Ah = A. In that gure, a high-ability individuals indi¤erence
curve in (t; P )-space is tangent to the marginal-cost line for t = 1, while that of a
low-ability individual is tangent to the marginal-cost line for some t 2 (0; 1).
< FIGURE 2 about here >
In the proposition below, we make use of the following assumption on u:
uh(c; 1)
uc(c; 1)
 uh(c
0; t)
uc(c0; t)
, if 0 < c0 < tc and 0 < t < 1. (6)
Any concave homothetic function of c and h satises this, but the assumption is also
satised by other demand systems.10 The proposition states that the individuals
utility is constant across states if she chooses full treatment. Her utility if ill is
lower than that if well if she chooses less than full treatment. Moreover, with full
treatment, she will not receive any cash payment in addition to what is required
to pay for treatment, while in the case of partial treatment, her compensation will
exceed the amount spent on medical treatment. The observations in the text above
partially prove the proposition; the proof is completed in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Assume that the condition in (6) holds. Then there exists a level of
ability, A, where C < A < C, such that:
1. If the individuals ability A is high, in particular, if A  A, then her optimum
level of treatment is the maximum one and does not vary with A: t(A) = 1.
Moreover, her level of consumption is identical in the two states: c1(1; C;A) =
c2(1; C;A) = A   C, as is her utility: u(c1; h1) = u(c2; h2) = u(A   C; 1).
Her insurance coverage is in the form of medical treatment only.
10The multiplicatively separable specication u(c; h) = v(c)w(h), where v0; w0 > 0 and v00; w00 < 0,
which is a one-period version of the utility function proposed by Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999),
satises all our assumptions. The specication u(c; h) = f(c + ah) + bh, where f 0; a; b > 0 and
f 00 < 0, used by Ma and Riordan (2002), satises all our assumptions (including (6)), except that it
has uch < 0. See Rey and Rochet (2004) for a discussion of various bivariate utility functions used
in health economics.
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2. If, however, the individuals ability A is low, in particular, if 0 < A < A, then
her optimal level of treatment is positive but less than one, 0 < t(A) < 1, and
increasing in A: @t(A)=@A > 0: Moreover, her level of consumption if ill is
lower than if healthy: c2(t(A); t(A)C;A) < c1(t(A); t(A)C;A), and her utility
if ill is lower than if healthy: u(c2; h2) < u(c1; h1). Her insurance coverage is
partly in the form of medical treatment and partly in the form of cash.
Proposition 1 can be illustrated by the following Bernoulli utility function:
u(c; h) = crhs, with r > 0; s > 0 and r + s < 1 ,
satisfying all our assumptions; see the Appendix for detailed calculations. In this
case,
A =
r + s
r + s
C;
and if A < A, then the following expression obtains for the cash compensation:
c2   t(A)A+A  c1 = r + s
(1  )st(A)
 
A  A . (7)
This means that the critical level A increases with both a greater probability  of
falling ill and a greater cost of treatment, C. Furthermore, for given values of  and
C (and hence, for a given A), the individuals level of ability, A, has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the size of the cash compensation. On the one hand, provided that A <
A, a smaller A leads to a greater relative importance of the cash compensation
through the term A  A. On the other hand, an individual with a smaller A has a
smaller initial endowment and will choose an insurance contract with a lower level
of total compensation. This moderating e¤ect on the size of the cash compensation
is reected by the term t(A), which decreases with a reduction in A when A < A.
4 Ex-post moral hazard
We have, in Proposition 1, shown that an ill individual with ability A lower than
the critical level A receives partial treatment, t(A) < 1, and, in addition, a positive
cash compensation:
c2(A)  t(A)A+A  c1(A) ;
where we from now on write c1(A) = c1(t(A); t(A)C;A) and c2(A) = c2(t(A);
t(A)C;A). If, contrary to what we assumed above, the two states (healthy/ill) are
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not observable, the availability of such a disability payment may tempt the individual
to claim that she has fallen ill, although she is in fact in good health. In this section,
we show that our analysis goes through even if we allow for such ex-post moral
hazard,11 provided that (i) the cash compensation is paid only in combination with
treatment; and (ii) the disutility of receiving treatment while healthy is su¢ ciently
great. Consequently, in order to prevent the individual from falsely claiming to be
ill, she should su¤er a loss in expected utility from undergoing redundant medical
treatment. Moreover, the disutility should at least balance the gains in expected
utility from masquerading as ill.
To ensure that a healthy individual with ability A does not falsely claim to be ill,
we must consider the possibility that she not only misrepresents her health state but
also her ability, in order to receive the higher cash compensation designed to be paid
to an individual with a di¤erent ability A0. Using the observation that an individual
has no incentive to lie about her ability unless she intends also to misrepresent her
health state, we provide, in the Appendix, a proof of the following result.
Proposition 2 The ex-post moral hazard of a healthy individual masquerading as
ill in order to obtain cash compensation does not constitute an incentive problem if,
for any true ability A and claimed ability A0, the additional utility that A obtains
from the cash compensation, c2(A0) t(A0)A0+A0 c1(A0), to be paid to A0 in case of
illness, does not exceed the disutility that A su¤ers from undergoing, when healthy,
redundant treatment at the level t(A0) that A0 is entitled to.
It is clear from this result that a healthy individual falsely claims to be ill only
after having purchased the optimal insurance contract of some ability A0 smaller
than A. The reason is that, according to Proposition 1, for any ability A0  A,
the optimal insurance contract includes no cash compensation, implying that the
disutility from undergoing redundant treatment will dominate. On the other hand,
if A0 < A, then there is a positive cash compensation. What can be said about how
this cash compensation varies with A0 for 0 < A0 < A?
To investigate this question, it might be instructive to look at the special Cobb-
Douglas case considered at the end of Section 3. It follows from the expression for
11Ex-post moral hazard refers to the e¤ect of insurance on the insured individuals incentives to
reveal her true health state (i.e., the insured individual knows the state of the world, while the
insurer does not, or verication of health state is too costly for the insurer). The analysis of ex-post
moral hazard was pioneered by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971). The idea that in-kind transfers, such
as medical treatment, can alleviate ex-post moral hazard is due to Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982).
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the cash compensation in (7) that the level of claimed ability, A0, has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the size of the cash compensation. While, with A0 < A, a smaller A0 leads
to a greater relative importance of the cash compensation through the term A A0,
there is a moderating e¤ect through the term t(A0), which reects that a smaller
A0 leads to an insurance contract with a lower level of total compensation. Hence,
provided that the disutility of receiving treatment while healthy does not decrease
signicantly with a smaller t, and thus with a smaller A0, this disutility exceeds, for
any true ability A and claimed ability A0, the additional utility obtained from the
cash compensation paid to A0 in case of illness.
When health state is not veriable, i.e., when ex-post moral hazard is a prob-
lem, the individual will have an incentive to masquerade as ill in order to acquire
a cash compensation. However, when cash compensation is made conditional on
medical treatment, we have shown that the individuals incentive to masquerade is
reduced since she will su¤er a disutility from receiving redundant treatment. The
ex-post moral hazard problem associated with cash compensation is hence solved in
our model through the integration of treatment for illness and payments for disabil-
ity. The lack of such integration can help explain why private markets for disability
insurance are of little empirical signicance. Naturally, one may argue that even
if treatment and cash compensation were not integrated, then information about
whether an individual is ill could be obtained if the insurer o¤ering disability insur-
ance could require information from the insurer o¤ering medical insurance. In this
case, information on the (contractually) adequate level of treatment as well as the
level of treatment actually undertaken is required. It follows that the informational
costs would be higher relative to a situation in which the two types of insurance are
integrated.
5 Discussion
Our focus has been on how an individuals inherent ability at full functionality (i.e.,
when healthy) inuences her ex-ante choice of insurance contract. Insurance allows
the individual to allocate income between the two health states prior to knowing
which state occurs and, if falling ill, between consumption and health.
It is of no importance, in a world of symmetric information, whether the coverage
for medical costs is paid in cash intended to cover medical bills, or directly in the
form of medical treatment. The individuals ex-ante decision concerning what level
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of treatment to choose is una¤ected by the way she is compensated; the fundamental
decision concerns to what extent health is to be restored.12 However, as discussed
in Section 4, if health state is not easily veriable, then it becomes essential whether
medical expenditures are compensated in cash or in kind. When information about
health state is asymmetric, integration of a cash compensation of income loss and
an in-kind compensation of medical expenditures reduces the individuals incentive
to falsely claim to be ill.
Our ndings are driven by the fact that the potential loss in income is larger,
the higher the ability. This implies that the prices of the two types of contracts
di¤er depending on the individuals ability. The higher the potential income loss
due to reduced ability, the cheaper is the contract o¤ering indemnity in kind (i.e.,
treatment), compared to a contract o¤ering cash compensation of income loss. Thus,
the cost-benet ratio on medical treatment is lower the higher the level of ability at
full functionality.
A Appendix
A.1 Properties of U
The single-crossing property: By di¤erentiation in (3), we nd that MRS is increas-
ing in A:
@MRS
@A
=
@
@A

uh(c2(t; P ;A); t)
uc(c2(t; P ;A); t)
+A

> 1;
since ucc < 0, uch > 0, and @c2=@A > 0. This is the single-crossing property.
Diminishing willingness to pay for treatment: We need to show that U is strictly
quasi-concave as a function of t and P . This is done by demonstrating that, if (t0; P 0)
and (t00; P 00) are di¤erent combinations yielding the same utility level given A, then
any interior convex combination
(t; P ) = (t0 + (1  )t00; P 0 + (1  )P 00) ; 0 <  < 1,
12Arrow (1963) mentions three di¤erent ways in which costs of medical care can be covered in an
insurance contract: payment directly in medical services, a xed cash payment, and a cash payment
that covers the actual costs involved in providing the necessary medical treatment. In a perfect
market, individuals wishing to receive medical treatment would be indi¤erent between a payment
directly in the form of medical treatment and its cash equivalent.
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will yield a strictly higher utility level. Accordingly, assume
U(t0; P 0; A) = U(t00; P 00; A) ;
and introduce some notation:
c01 = c1(t0; P 0; A) c001 = c1(t00; P 00; A)
c02 = c2(t0; P 0; A) c002 = c2(t00; P 00; A):
Also, let (c1; c2) = (c01+(1 )c001; c02+(1 )c002). Since (c01; c02) satises the ex-ante
constraint (1) given (t0; P 0; A) and (c001; c002) satises constraint (1) given (t00; P 00; A), it
follows that also (c1; c2) satises constraint (1) given (t; P;A), implying that (c1; c2)
is feasible. Hence,
U(t; P;A)  (1  )u(c1; 1) + u(c2; t)
> (1  )[u(c01; 1) + (1  )u(c001; 1)] + [u(c02; t0) + (1  )u(c002; t00)]
= U(t0; P 0; A) + (1  )U(t00; P 00; A)
where the rst inequality follows since (c1; c2) is feasible, and the second inequality
follows since u is strictly concave.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Part (1). Given the observations in the text prior to the proposition, it remains to
show that the individuals utility is constant across states, and that she has insurance
coverage in the form of medical treatment only.
Constant utility across states follows since c1 = c2 = A   C and h1 = h2 = 1.
Since cash payment equals c2   tA + A   c1 (see footnote 9), it follows that cash
payment is zero.
Part (2). Given the observations in the text prior to the proposition, it remains
to show that the individuals utility if ill is lower than if healthy, and that she receives
a positive cash compensation if ill.
By the denition of A, 0  t(A) < 1 whenever 0 < A < A. Moreover, since
uh(c; h) ! 1 as h # 0 whenever c > 0, and uc(c; h) ! 1 or uh(c; h) ! 1 as
c # 0 and h # 0, it follows from A > 0 and equation (3) that MRS > C if t is
su¢ ciently small; hence, t(A) > 0. Now, the single-crossing property implies that
dt(A)=dA > 0. From equation (2) and the properties of u, it follows that c1 > c2,
since h1 = 1, and h2 = t(A) < 1. This in turn implies that u(c1; 1) > u(c2; h2). To
show that cash payment is positive, i.e., that c2   tA + A   c1 > 0, we start out
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with the observation that t(A) is determined by MRS = C whenever 0 < t(A) < 1.
Using the expression for MRS in (3), we have that the marginal willingness to pay
for treatment equals the marginal cost of treatment: uh(c2; t)=uc(c2; t) +A = C. In
the hypothetical case where treatment were available also if healthy, or inversely,
where health could be sold at price C   A, the access to actuarially fair insurance
would imply the same level of health in both states. Since this is not the case, it
is a binding constraint that healthy individuals cannot sell health at price C   A,
implying that: uh(c1; 1)=uc(c1; 1) < C   A = uh(c2; t)=uc(c2; t). Hence, e¤ectively,
the relative price of health in terms of consumption is lower if healthy than if ill.
It follows by assumption (6) that tc1  c2. Moreover, constraint (1) entails that
c1  A   tC if and only if c2  tA   tC. Therefore, c1  A   tC leads to the
following contradiction: tc1  t (A  tC) > tA   tC  c2. Thus, we have that
c1 < A   tC and c2 > tA   tC. This in turn means that c1   A < c2   tA, or
c2   tA+A  c1 > 0:
A.3 Calculations for the Cobb-Douglas case
The following Cobb-Douglas function is a Bernoulli utility function that satises all
assumptions listed in Section 2, as well as the condition in (6):
u(c; h) = crhs, with r > 0; s > 0 and r + s < 1 .
With this function, it is possible explicitly to calculate A. We have that
MRS (1; C;A) = uh(c2;1)uc(c2;1) +A
= uh(A C;1)uc(A C;1) +A =
s
r (A  C) +A ,
where the rst equality follows from (3), the second equality follows since c2 = A C
when t = 1 and P = C, and the third equality follows since
uh(c; h)
uc(c; h)
=
s
r
 c
h
(A1)
when u is given by the Cobb-Douglas function above. Since A is dened by
MRS (1; C;A) = C, we can nd A by solving
s
r
(A   C) +A = C,
which implies that
A =
r + s
r + s
 C: (A2)
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Since, for A < A, t is determined by MRS = C, we get, by invoking equations
(3) and (A1), that
s
r
 c2
t
+A = C . (A3)
Moreover, by letting the cash compensation, c2   tA + A   c1, be denoted by x, it
follows from equation (1) that
x  c2 + tA = [tC + x] . (A4)
We now have that
(1  )x = tC + c2   tA
= tC + rs t(C  A)  tA
= 1s

(r + s)C   (r + s)At
= r+ss
 
A  At ,
where the rst equality follows from (A4), the second equality follows from (A3),
and the fourth equality follows from (A2). We have thereby shown that the cash
compensation can be expressed as in (7).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Denote by v(c; t) the (direct) disutility of receiving treatment t while healthy and
consuming c; to be precise, v(c; t) is the di¤erence between the utility derived from
consumption c when healthy and not receiving unnecessary treatment and the utility
derived from consumption c when healthy and receiving unnecessary treatment t.
Assume that v satises, 8(c; t) 2 R2++, v(c; t) > 0 and vt  0.
To prevent problems caused by ex-post moral hazard, the following inequality
must hold, for any true ability A and claimed ability A0:
(1  )u(c1(A); 1) + u(c2(A); t(A)) 
(1  )u(c02; 1)  v(c02; t(A0))+ u(c2(A0) + t(A0)(A A0); t(A0)) : (A5)
Here, c02 = c2(A0) + (A   t(A0)A0) represents the consumption that a healthy indi-
vidual with ability A receives having purchased the optimal insurance contract of an
individual with ability A0 and masquerading as ill, while c2(A0) + t(A0)(A   A0) is
the consumption that an ill individual with ability A receives having purchased the
optimal insurance contract of ability A0 and truly claiming to be ill. An individual
with ability A > (<) A0 generates higher (lower) earnings and can, therefore, sustain
a higher (lower) level of consumption than can an individual with ability A0.
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In condition (A5), we allow the claimed ability A0 to take any value, including
the real ability A. Hence, we do not require that an individual also lies about her
ability when she misrepresents her health state, but we allow for this possibility.
Of course, a misinterpretation of ability must, if it occurs, take place before the
individual knows whether she has fallen ill or not; this is reected by the last term
on the right-hand side of condition (A5).
To nd a su¢ cient condition for (A5) to hold for any true ability A and any
claimed ability A0, the following observation is useful: (c1(A); c2(A); t(A)) maxi-
mizes expected utility over all triples (c1; c2; t) satisfying (1); in particular,
(1  )u(c1(A); 1) + u(c2(A); t(A)) 
(1  )u(c01; 1) + u(c2(A0) + t(A0)(A A0); t(A0)) ,
(A6)
where c01 = c1(A0) + (A   A0) is the consumption that a healthy individual with
ability A receives having purchased the optimal insurance contract of ability A0 and
not masquerading as ill. This means that an individual with ability A does not lie
about her ability unless she intends also to misrepresent her health state.
The increase in consumption that an individual with ability A, having purchased
the insurance contract of ability A0, obtains by masquerading as ill, c02  c01, is equal
to the cash compensation designed to be paid to an individual with ability A0:
c02   c01 = c2(A0)  t(A0)A0 +A0   c1(A0) :
Moreover, by (A6), it is a su¢ cient condition for (A5) to be satised, for any true
ability A and claimed ability A0, that
u(c02; 1)  u(c01; 1)  v(c02; t(A0)) (A7)
holds for any true ability A and any claimed ability A0. This completes the proof of
Proposition 2.
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Figure 1. The single-crossing property 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The optimal level of treatment  
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